

## **EXHIBIT 47B**

religious groups have moved from the stage of *Takfir* [condemning other Muslims as unbelievers] to the stage of 'annihilation and destruction,' in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qa'ida – which Saudi authorities must admit is a local Saudi organization that drew other organizations into it, and not the other way around. All the organizations emerged from under the robe of Wahhabism."

"I can state with certainty that after a very careful reading of all the documents and texts of the official investigations linked to all acts of terror that have taken place in Egypt, from the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadat in October 1981, up to the Luxor massacre in 1997, Saudi Arabia was the main station through which most of the Egyptian extremists passed, and emerged bearing with them terrorist thought regarding *Takfir* – thought that they drew from the sheikhs of Wahhabism. They also bore with them funds they received from the Saudi charities."

(Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series - No. 526 - Saudi Arabia, June 20, 2003)

Thus, while some Western commentators have sought to explain the roots of al-Qaeda's fury at the U.S. by focusing on the history of American policy in the Middle East or other external factors, a rising number of Middle Eastern analysts have concentrated instead on internal Saudi factors, including recent militant trends among Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi clerics and the role of large Saudi global charities in terrorist finance. This requires a careful look at how Saudi Arabia contributed to the ideological roots of some of the new wave of international terrorism as well as how the kingdom emerged as a critical factor in providing the resources needed by many terrorist groups.

#### Historical Roots

The particular creed of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, which is known in the West as Wahhabism, emerged in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century in Central Arabia from the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. This Arabian religious reformer sought to rid Islam of foreign innovations that compromised its monotheistic foundations and to restore what he believed were

the religious practices of the 7<sup>th</sup> century at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors. He established a political covenant in 1744 with Muhammad bin Saud, according to which he received bin Saud's protection and in exchange legitimized the spread of Saudi rule over a widening circle of Arabian tribes. This covenant between the Saudi royal family and Wahhabism is at the root of modern Saudi Arabia.

In retrospect, Wahhabism was significant for two reasons. First, it rejuvenated the idea of the militant *jihad*, or holy war, which had declined as a central Islamic value to be applied universally. Under the influence of Sufism, for example, *jihad* had also evolved into a more spiritual concept. Second, Wahhabism became associated with a brutal history of political expansion that led to the massacre of Muslims who did not adhere to its tenets, the most famous of which occurred against the Shiites Muslims of Kerbala in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century and against Sunni Muslims in Arabian cities, like Taif, during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. These Muslims were labeled as polytheists and did not deserve any protection. The highest spiritual authority of Islam during this period, the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire, regarded the Wahhabis as heretics and waged wars against them in defense of Islam.

Yet it would be a mistake to focus on Wahhabism alone as the ideological fountainhead of the new global terrorism. Modern Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s hosted other militant movements that had an important impact, as well. For reasons of regional geopolitics, King Saud, King Faisal, and their successors provided sanctuary to elements of the radical Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Syria. Some were provided Saudi stipends. Others were given positions in the Saudi educational system, including the universities, or in the large Saudi charities, like the Muslim World League, that was created in 1962. For example, Egyptian President Abdul Nasser had the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966; his brother, Muhammad Qutb, fled to Saudi Arabia and taught at King Abdul Aziz University in Jiddah. He was joined in the 1970s by one of the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood from Jordan, Abdullah Azzam. In 1979, both taught Osama bin Laden, a student at the university.

Saudi Arabia's global charities, like the Muslim World League, permitted the spread of the new militancy that was forged from the cooperation between the Wahhabi clerics and the Muslim Brotherhood refugees. After 1973, these charities benefited from the huge petrodollar resources

dispensed by the Saudi government, which undoubtedly helped them achieve a global reach. Abdullah Azzam headed the office of the Muslim World League in Peshawar, Pakistan, when it served as the rear base for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He was joined by his student, bin Laden, who with Saudi funding also set up the Mujahidin Services Center (Maktab Khadmat al-Mujahidin) for Muslim volunteers who came to fight the Red Army. After Moscow's defeat in Afghanistan, this office became al-Qaeda.

Thus, the Saudi charities became instrumental for the continuing global *jihad*. Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, ran the offices of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a Muslim World League offshoot, in the Philippines. Local intelligence agencies suspected that it served as a financial conduit to the Abu Sayyaf organization. Muhammad Zawahiri, brother of bin Laden's Egyptian partner, Ayman Zawahiri, would eventually work for IIRO in Albania. Indeed, IIRO would eventually be suspected of involvement in terrorist threats in India, Kenya, and to Russian forces in Chechnya.

#### **Ideological Roots of the New Terrorism**

These developments seem far beyond the horizon of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but not completely, for a careful examination of the religious sources of some of the worst suicide bombings against the State of Israel by the Hamas organization leads also to Saudi Arabia. Looking at Hamas websites, this very month, one finds Saudi clerics prominently featured as providing the religious justification for suicide bombings. Of 16 religious leaders cited by Hamas, the largest national group backing these attacks are Saudis. The formal Saudi position on suicide bombings, in fact, has been mixed. To his credit, the current Saudi Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al al-Sheikh, has condemned these acts. Yet at the same time, Saudi Arabia's Minister for Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Saleh Al al-Sheikh, has condoned them: "The suicide bombings are permitted...the victims are considered to have died a martyr's death."

The Hamas-Saudi connection should not come as a surprise. Hamas emerged in 1987 from the Gaza branch of Muslim Brotherhood which, as noted earlier, had become a key Saudi ally during previous decades. When Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yasin was let out of an Israeli

prison in 1998, he went to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment and Crown Prince Abdullah made a high-profile visit to his hospital bedside. Bin Laden had made the fate of Sheikh Yasin an issue for his al-Qaeda followers as well. In his 1996 "Declaration of War," he listed Sheikh Yasin's release from prison as one of his demands or grievances.

Saudi support for suicide bombings has wider repercussions. Other militant Islamic movements cite Saudi clerics to justify their activities – from the Chechen groups battling the Russians to Iraqi mujahidin (al-jam'ah al-salifiyah) fighting the U.S. army in western Iraq. In order to evaluate the significance of these religious rulings, it is necessary to focus on the stature of these various clerical figures.

For example, just after the September 11 attacks, it is true that many Saudi government officials condemned them. But there were other voices as well. Shortly thereafter a Saudi book appeared on the Internet justifying the murder of thousands of Americans, entitled *The Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction That Befell America*. The Introduction to the book was written by a prominent Saudi religious leader, Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaibi. He wrote on November 16, 2001, that he hoped Allah would bring further destruction upon the United States. Al-Shuaibi's name appears in a book entitled the *Great Book of Fatwas*, found in a Taliban office in Kabul. Sheikh al-Shuaibi appears on the Hamas website, noted earlier, as a religious source for suicide attacks. He appears on the website of the Islamic militants fighting the U.S. army in western Iraq as well. His ideas had global reach.

The question that must be asked is whether a religious leader of this sort is a peripheral figure on the fringes of society or whether he reflects more mainstream thinking. In fact, al-Shuaibi had very strong credentials. Born in 1925 in the Wahhabi stronghold of Buraida, he was a student of King Faisal's Grand Mufti, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al al-Sheikh. Al-Shuaibi's roster of students read like a "Who's Who" of Saudi Arabia, including the current Grand Mufti and the former Minister of Islamic Affairs and Muslim World League secretary-general, Abdullah al-Turki. When al-Shuaibi died in 2002, many central Saudi figures attended his funeral. In short, he was mainstream. His militant ideas about justifying the September 11 attacks were echoed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman Jibrin, who actually was a member of the Directorate of

Religious Research, Islamic Legal Rulings, and Islamic Propagation and Guidance – an official branch of the Saudi government.

#### **Financial Support for the New Global Terrorism**

As already demonstrated, Saudi Arabia erected a number of large global charities in the 1960s and 1970s whose original purpose may have been to spread Wahhabi Islam, but which became penetrated by prominent individuals from al-Qaeda's global *jihadi* network. The three most prominent of these charities were the International Islamic Relief Organization (an offshoot of the Muslim World League), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and the Charitable Foundations of al-Haramain. All three are suspected by various global intelligence organizations of terrorist funding.

It would be incorrect to view these charities as purely non-governmental organizations. At the apex of each organization's board is a top Saudi official. The Saudi Grand Mufti, who is also a Saudi cabinet member, chairs the Constituent Council of the Muslim World League. The Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs chairs the secretariat of WAMY and the administrative council of al-Haramain. All three organizations have received large charitable contributions from the Saudi royal family that have been detailed in Saudi periodicals.

The earliest documented links between one of these charities and terrorists was found in Bosnia. It is a handwritten account on IIRO stationery from the late 1980s indicating the use of this charity's offices for the support of militant actions. But the strongest documented cases that demonstrate the ties between Saudi Arabia's global charities and international terrorism are related to Hamas. These ties were alleged already in the mid-1990s when a Hamas funding group received instructions to write letters of thanks to executives of IIRO and WAMY for funds it had received. In 1994, President Clinton made a brief stopover in Saudi Arabia during which he complained about Saudi funding of Hamas. These charges about Saudi Arabia bankrolling Hamas have become even more vociferous in recent years.

The Saudis have been equally vociferous in their denials. Crown Prince Abdullah's foreign

policy advisor, Adel al-Jubeir, asserted on CNN's "Crossfire" on August 16, 2002: "We do not allow funding to go from Saudi Arabia to Hamas." More recently, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal told the Saudi daily *Arab News* on June 23, 2003, that since the establishment of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Saudi Kingdom only sends funding through the PLO. He denied that the Saudis finance Hamas.

Yet during Israel's Operation Defensive Shield last year, a whole array of documents was uncovered which show these repeated Saudi denials to be completely baseless. One of the strongest pieces of evidence came from a handwritten letter written in Arabic by the current Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), on December 30, 2000, to Prince Salman, governor of Riyadh and a full brother of King Fahd. Abbas complained that Saudi donations in the Gaza Strip are going to an organization called al-Jamiya al-Islamiya (the Islamic Society), which Abbas explained "belongs to Hamas." He wanted the funds for Fatah.

Al-Jamiya al-Islamiya was not just a Hamas front, supporting positive social programs and secretly diverting funds to military activity. Even its showcase activities were reprehensible. For example, at a kindergarten graduation involving some of its 1,600 Palestinian pre-schoolers, children wore uniforms and carried mock rifles. Others re-enacted the lynching of Israelis or other terrorist attacks. Thus, the Saudis were not only funding the current generation of terrorism but also the next generation as well.

There were other documents linking Saudi institutions to terrorist financing. An actual IIRO document was found that detailed how \$280,000 was to be allocated to 14 Hamas front groups. Checks made out to well-known Hamas fronts from the corporate account of al-Rajhi Banking and Investment at Chase Manhattan Bank were also uncovered. Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment was one of the largest Saudi banking networks which serviced the Saudi charities. Its head, Sulaiman al-Rajhi, headed the family that established the SAAR (the acronym for his name) foundation in Herndon, Virginia, which was raided last year by U.S. federal agents because of suspected terrorist links.

There were other conduits for terrorist funding that were disclosed. Spreadsheets of the Saudi

Committee for Aid to the al-Quds Intifada were found. These lists, that detailed the movement of moneys to the families of suicide bombers, were significant. Saudi spokesmen tried to distance themselves from this activity by arguing that they helped these families through international aid organizations. Yet it became clear from the spreadsheets that these contributions were given through a specifically Saudi organization that was headed by the Saudi Minister of the Interior Prince Naif. Indeed, at the top right-hand side of the spreadsheet found in the West Bank, the name "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" stands out. In the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, this kind of support "incentivized" the suicide terrorist attacks.

The Hamas case demonstrated the mode of operation of Saudi charities in support of terrorism. It was significant for those investigating other cases of global terrorism, including al-Qaeda, since very often these groups shared the same funding mechanisms. As a case study, it is particularly useful, since it is the best-documented case of how the Saudis used their charities to back militant activities.

#### **Current Situation**

Most of the documents discovered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were dated from the year 2000. Saudi diplomats argued that after September 11, 2001, they had turned over a new leaf. For example, in October 2002, the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington released a statement detailing the steps they had taken to keep better track of what the charities were doing. The Saudi statement asserted that since September 11, 2001, "charitable groups have been closely monitored and additional audits have been performed to assure that there are no links to suspected groups."

Yet, the very same month the newest Saudi assurances were provided in Washington, one of the top leaders of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, was invited to Riyadh for a WAMY conference. So while in Washington the press corps was told that there were no longer any ties between the Saudi charities and suspected groups, in Riyadh, one of the three main Saudi charities was hosting the leader of one of the suspected groups, Hamas, that had been labeled by the U.S. government as



an international terrorist organization. According to a captured Hamas document that detailed Khaled Mashal's visit to Saudi Arabia, he actually had been invited by Crown Prince Abdullah himself. While Hamas had refused at the time to stop its suicide attacks, nonetheless, Saudi officials reassured Mashal of continuing support.

A new context for the issue of Saudi funding of terrorist groups was created when President Bush issued the "Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" on April 30, 2003. Besides requiring difficult measures by Israelis and Palestinians alike, the new Bush administration plan specifically called on Arab states in its first phase to "cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror." In short, Saudi Arabia had to come under the roadmap, as well. Meeting the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain at Sharm el-Sheikh on June 3, 2003, President Bush announced that they had committed themselves to use all means to cut off assistance to any terror group.

It might have been expected that Saudi Arabia would adhere to this firm U.S. policy. On May 12, 2003, Saudi Arabia itself was struck by a triple suicide bombing that led to 35 fatalities, including 9 Americans. Having denied that there was an al-Qaeda presence in the Saudi kingdom, the Saudi government began uncovering al-Qaeda cells and munitions in Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, Jidda, and in the northern al-Jawf area. Having provided the ideological and financial basis for the growth of al-Qaeda and its sister organizations, including Hamas, Saudi Arabia found that the fire they had ignited was coming back to burn them as well.

Unfortunately, while the Saudis appear to be taking their own domestic threat seriously, there is no indication that they have scaled back their support for Hamas. The Israeli national assessment is that Saudi Arabia today funds more than 50 percent of the needs of Hamas and the Saudi percentage in the total foreign aid to Hamas is actually growing. Saudi Arabia continues to aid the families of suicide bombers. It helps dual-use charities and charities that funnel funds directly to military activities against Israel.

At present, Hamas has agreed to a temporary truce with Israel called a *hudna*, but it is vigorously

seeking to rebuild its operational infrastructure, including an effort to increase the quantity and quality of Qassam rockets launched against Israeli towns. Muslim writers have argued in the past that a *hudna* is to be maintained until the balance of power improves for the Muslim side. Funding Hamas today jeopardizes the present cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians and increases the likelihood that Hamas will return to militant action.

It is instructive to recall that in 1995, Saudi Arabia's National Guard headquarters was struck by pro-bin Laden forces, as well. Domestic threats in the mid-1990s did not cause the Saudis to halt their assistance to *jihadi* groups abroad, like Hamas or the Taliban, in the past. Riyadh appears able to draw a distinction between acts of domestic subversion and international terrorist activities, which are seen as part of the global *jihad*.

#### Conclusions

This testimony was intended to disclose the critical role of Saudi Arabia in providing ideological and financial support for the new terrorism. While most of the evidence presented here comes from the specific case of Hamas, the modus operandi adopted in the Hamas case is probably applicable to other parts of the global terrorist network as well. This is especially true of the critical role of Saudi Arabia's global charities in sustaining many similar militant organizations from Indonesia to central Russia. While Saudi spokesmen have provided repeated assurances that they have cleaned up these activities, their denials with respect to terrorist funding do not stand up against the documented evidence that has accumulated in the last two years.

The Saudi government faces hard dilemmas. It has recently taken disciplinary action against some of its most extreme religious leaders. But traditionally, the Saudis need the backing of their clerics to legitimize their regime; that is the heart of the Saudi-Wahhabi covenant that dates back to the 18th century. Yet the Saudis also need the ultimate protective shield provided by the United States. In order to sustain this, they have spent huge sums of money for public relations firms and influence-brokers. But the time has come to tell the Saudis that they have to make a choice. After September 11, there has to be zero tolerance for terrorist funding and other forms

of terrorist support.

The stakes involved are not just a question of public relations or Arab-Israel point-scoring in Washington. The West needs to come to an understanding with the Islamic world based on mutual respect and tolerance. The radicalization of the Middle East being promoted by the Saudis undermines that goal and threatens to substitute instead a vision of perpetual militancy and conflict. For that reason, what is at stake is nothing less than the security of the United States and its allies, as well as the question of whether the Middle East moves in the direction of hope and peace or relapses into a state of continuing strife.


Saudi Minister of Interior Prince  
Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz, November,  
2002;

- “We put big question marks and ask who committed the events of September 11 and who benefited from them... **I think they [the Zionists] are behind these events**...I cannot still believe that 19 youths, including 15 Saudis, carried out the September 11 attacks with the support of bin Laden and his Al-Qa`ida organization. It’s impossible. I will not believe that these people have the power to do so horrendous an attack.”

Abdallah Bin Matruk Al-Haddal -  
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, January,  
2002;

- “...bin Laden waged an Islamic Jihad; he defended the oppressed people in Afghanistan. He expelled the Soviet Union [from Afghanistan] ...**Men like bin Laden will not allow the Islamic world to bow down under the infidel enemies’ tyranny, under the tyranny of the U.S...**”

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PIX: KHALIL ABDEL AZIZ, TEACHER FROM SAUDI ARABIA

## **11<sup>th</sup> Grade Saudi Textbook Distributed in the United States;**

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- **“... the Summons to Islam in its initial stages was confronted by this when factions of the Jews strove to oppose it and deceive it by various treacherous and perfidious methods, violating their agreement with the Messenger of Allah. Allah responded to their deception by slaughtering them, cleansing the land of their evil and filth. The word of Truth was exalted, victories followed one after another and booty came continuously to the Muslims...”**



الإصابة في طلب الشهادة ، جابر بن عبد القوم الساعدي الشامي أبو القتيبة


“The Foundations of the Legality of the  
Destruction that Befell America”

( ما كان الله ليقتل المؤمنين على ما اتهم عليه حتى يميز الخبيث من الطيب )

التأصيل  
لمشروعية ما حصل لأمريكا من  
تدمير

تقديم  
الشيخ العلامة حمود الحطّاء  
والشيخ الفاضل علي الحضر

كتبه / عبد العزيز بن صالح الجريوع



Fatwah Authorizing the Use of WMD

رسالة  
في  
حكم استخدام أسلحة الدمار الشامل  
ضد الكفار

: كتبه  
ناصر بن حمد الفهد

ربيع الأول - 1424

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## Saudi National Charities and the Financing of International Terrorism

	IIRO	WAMY	al-Haramain
	International Islamic Relief Organization	World Assembly of Muslim Youth	Charitable Foundations of al-Haramain
CHAIRMAN	Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al al- Sheikh	Sheikh Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al al- Sheikh	Sheikh Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al al- Sheikh
TITLE	(Grand Mufti, Saudi Cabinet Member)	(Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saudi Cabinet Member)	(Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saudi Cabinet Member)
RELATION TO SAUDI GOVERNMENT	Chairman of Constituent Council of World Muslim League	Chairman of WAMY Secretariat	Chairman of al- Haramain Administrative Council
OFFICIAL SOURCES OF FUNDING	DONATIONS FROM SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY	DONATIONS FROM SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY	DONATIONS FROM SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY

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## The "Golden Chain"

MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE  
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF  
ORGANIZATION



الجمعية العالمية للإسلام  
التي تأسست في  
البحرين في شهر ربيع الأول سنة 1405 هـ

No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
الحمد لله الذي جعلنا من عباده المرسلين

مستفيحي الهدى والرشاد والهدى إلى الله وإلى ربه وإلى  
الجنة - والجنة إلى الله وإلى ربه وإلى الجنة

لقد كنت من جملة من سجدت في مكة المكرمة في شهر ربيع الأول سنة 1405 هـ  
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### Saudi Denials of Terrorist Support for Hamas

- Adel al-Jubeir, Foreign Policy Advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah (CNN Crossfire August 16, 2002) “We do not allow funding to go from Saudi Arabia to Hamas.”

- Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal (Arab News June 23, 2003) – Asked if the kingdom had ever financed the Islamic movements in Palestine (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) whether directly or indirectly, Prince Saud said that since the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the kingdom has been sending remittances through the PLO.




**Abu Mazen Handwritten Letter to Prince  
Salman – Stop Funding Hamas!**

I hereby wish to inform you that he [Yasser Arafat] has spoken with me on the telephone and asked me to transmit to you his request that you mediate and interfere, and express his view concerning the ongoing situation in our homeland. The Saudi committee responsible for transferring the donations to beneficiaries has been sending large amounts to radical committees and associations, among which the "Islamic society" [al-Jam'iya al-Islamiya] which belongs to Hamas, the "al-Islah" association [an association known to be a Hamas institution in Gaza], and to the brethren who engage in jihad in all regions. This fact badly influences the internal situation; it also results in strengthening these brethren, and has therefore a negative impact on all sides. Moreover, the committee does not send any money or assistance to the members of Fatah



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### Islamic Society in Gaza – A Hamas Front




102

### Islamic Society in Gaza – A Hamas Front




103

IIRO Disbursement of \$280,000 to 14 Hamas  
Fronts



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### Saudi Chase Manhattan Check



ردیف	نام و نام خانوادگی	تاریخ تولد	تاریخ فوت	محل تولد	محل فوت	سابقه خدمت	رتبه	نوع خدمت	توضیحات
1	محمد علی محمدی	1302/05/10	1385/03/20	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
2	علیرضا محمدی	1303/02/15	1386/01/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
3	فریدون محمدی	1304/08/20	1387/05/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
4	محمدرضا محمدی	1305/01/10	1388/02/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
5	علی محمدی	1306/03/25	1389/04/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
6	مهدی محمدی	1307/06/15	1390/03/05	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
7	فرهاد محمدی	1308/09/10	1391/06/20	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
8	محمدرضا محمدی	1309/12/05	1392/01/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
9	علیرضا محمدی	1310/04/20	1393/03/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
10	فریدون محمدی	1311/07/15	1394/05/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
11	محمدرضا محمدی	1312/10/10	1395/08/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
12	علی محمدی	1313/01/25	1396/02/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
13	مهدی محمدی	1314/05/10	1397/04/20	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
14	فرهاد محمدی	1315/08/25	1398/07/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
15	محمدرضا محمدی	1316/11/15	1399/10/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
16	علیرضا محمدی	1317/03/05	1400/02/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
17	فریدون محمدی	1318/06/20	1401/05/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
18	محمدرضا محمدی	1319/09/10	1402/08/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
19	علی محمدی	1320/12/25	1403/11/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
20	مهدی محمدی	1321/04/15	1404/03/20	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
21	فرهاد محمدی	1322/07/20	1405/06/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
22	محمدرضا محمدی	1323/10/10	1406/09/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
23	علیرضا محمدی	1324/01/25	1407/02/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
24	فریدون محمدی	1325/05/10	1408/05/20	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
25	محمدرضا محمدی	1326/08/25	1409/08/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
26	علی محمدی	1327/11/15	1410/11/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
27	مهدی محمدی	1328/03/05	1411/03/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
28	فرهاد محمدی	1329/06/20	1412/06/15	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
29	محمدرضا محمدی	1330/09/10	1413/09/25	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد
30	علیرضا محمدی	1331/12/25	1414/12/10	تهران	تهران	سپه پاسدار	سرتیپ یکم	کمیته امداد	در جریان خدمت فوت شد

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Report From the Website of the Royal  
Embassy of Saudi Arabia



Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia  
Information Office  
Washington, D.C.

**PRESS RELEASE**  
**October 18, 2002**

**Saudi actions to crack down on terrorist financing:**

- **Since September 11, all charitable groups have been audited to ensure that there are no links to suspected groups. Financial control mechanisms are required to ensure that evildoers cannot take advantage of these charitable groups in the future.**

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### Khaled Mishal Visits Riyadh



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## Roadmap



### **A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

**At the outset of Phase I:**

**Security:**

**"Arab states cut off public and private funding  
and all other forms of support for groups  
supporting and engaging in violence and  
terror."**



**President Bush at Sharm El-Sheikh Summit:**

**“The leaders here today have declared their firm rejection of terror, regardless of its justifications or motives. They've also committed to practical actions to use all means to cut off assistance, including arms and financing to any terror group, and to aid the Palestinian Authority in their own fight against terror.” (June 3, 2003)**

Origins, Organization and Prevention of Terrorist Finance  
Testimony  
Jonathan M. Winer  
Alston & Bird LLP  
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
International Law Enforcement  
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs  
July 31, 2003

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

I am honored to testify here today to share my views on terrorist finance, developed during my service as Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State from 1994 through 1999, and most recently, in connection with my service on as a member of the Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations on Terrorist Finance chaired by Maurice R. Greenberg and directed by William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky. My testimony has been heavily informed by and is consistent with the report issued by that Task Force in the fall of 2002, whose recommendations I endorse. The views as expressed are my own, but the recommendations I make here parallel in large part those of the Task Force as regrettably few of the recommendations made almost a year ago have yet to become reality.

On the U.S. side, it is essential that the Administration declassify much of the information it may have regarding Saudi terrorist finance, starting with the matters pertaining to the September 11 attacks. With almost two years having passed since the attacks, it can do so without imperiling investigations: the terrorist financiers covered their tracks long ago. I spent years reviewing highly sensitive intelligence information pertaining to illicit finance. I do not find credible the assertions that have been made that declassifying information provided to Congress by the Administration more than a year ago would jeopardize U.S. national security. Sunlight is the best disinfectant. The people have a right to know about the trail of money that made it possible for the September 11 terrorists to murder our people. The material should be declassified.

As a second recommendation, let me emphasize how important it is that the government of Saudi Arabia make public what it knows regarding terrorist finance activities of some key Saudi Arabian businessmen as well as make public what it has done to seize the assets of and punish its terrorist financiers. It is deeply ironic that Saudi Arabia has demanded that the U.S. declassify and release portions of the September 11 report that reportedly discuss Saudi terrorist funding. The Saudi government itself continues to maintain secrecy about what it now knows about past financial support for terrorism on the part of Saudi businessmen. It similarly continues to maintain secrecy about its own actions, if any, against the assets of such businessmen.

The relationship between the U.S and Saudi Arabia has been sorely torn by September 11. If Saudi Arabia is to repair that relationship, as well as restore its image internationally, it needs to go beyond the public actions it is now taking against terrorists in Saudi Arabia, to take public actions against those who funded Al Qaeda, permitting the allocation of millions of dollars donated in the name of charity to Islamic terrorists who used them in the cause of mass murder.

#### Summary

Until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorist finance had remained a back-burner issue internationally, despite efforts by the U.S. to require countries to make it a serious crime and to prosecute it as a serious crime. Combating terrorist finance was especially minimalist in the Middle East, where no jurisdiction had taken substantial steps to discourage it, and few even had minimal anti-money laundering or financial transparency laws in place.

Since the attacks, international organizations, responding largely to US-led efforts, issued a series of measures mandating that jurisdictions curtail the passage of terrorist finance, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the FATF Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Finance, and significant initiatives by the G-8 and the European Union. Each of these resolutions made clear in broad terms that nations must take more action to inhibit the passage of terrorist finance through domestic financial institutions. These international efforts were supported by individual acts of legislation passed by numerous jurisdictions, including global financial centers such as the United Kingdom and United States, and states in the Middle East and southwest Asia previously known for minimal oversight of their financial sectors. The resolutions were passed in an effort to impede the passage of funds to terrorist groups in the Americas, Asia, Middle East and Western Europe.

During the first two years after the September 11 attacks, these initiatives have achieved modest successes. Several dozen nations have seized terrorist assets, together comprising more than \$112 million, according to the UN terrorist monitoring group. Many more countries, including a number in the Middle East, have declared that despite diligent search, there have been no terrorist funds to be found. The U.S has shut down one substantial international hawala network, Al Barakaat. However, there is little evidence to date that new laws requiring alternative remittance houses to register, enacted in the U.S., Hong Kong and elsewhere, have yet had the desired effect of forcing such institutions to either submit to regulation and transparency or to shut down. While a substantial number of countries have enacted new laws and imposed new regulations to avoid name and shame lists, institutions licensed in poorly regulated jurisdictions still have substantially unimpeded access to the financial institutions and markets of New York, London, and Tokyo. Gold and diamond markets, hedge funds, and free-trade zones continue to abound, with few controls and open access to international wire transfer capabilities. In practice, while terrorist groups face new risks in laundering their money, they continue to have a variety of mechanisms by which to finance their activities, involving a range of both banking and non-banking financial institutions. Further

progress in protecting against international terrorist finance is unlikely without international action to require customer identification and verification, know-your-customer, and the ability to trace funds across jurisdictions. Whether non-Islamic states with sophisticated financial services sectors will require the financial institutions they regulate to require such standards of their foreign counterparts, especially in the Middle East and Asia remains to be seen.

Much about the origin and history of recent terrorist finance remains veiled not only by the terrorists but also by ongoing investigative efforts and government secrecy. But one core fact should by now no longer be in dispute: Saudi Arabia has been the most significant source of terrorist funds for Al Qaeda. Accordingly, the response of Saudi Arabia to the terrorist finance problem remains at the center of an effective global response to terrorism. Although Saudi Arabia has now undertaken a series of actions to combat terrorist finance, it has yet to take a number of critically important public actions that will be essential for the further disruption of Al Qaeda's global operations. Steps that have been taken include Saudi disruption of operational cells and arrests or killings of more than 25 suspected members of al Qaeda; announcements that audits of Saudi based charities have been completed; condemnations of extremism and arrests of radical clerics. However, other major terrorist financiers continue to live in Saudi Arabia not visibly affected by enforcement activity.

For further progress against terrorist finance, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia need to take further actions. Here at home, we need to centralize coordination and oversight of terrorist finance. The President should appoint a special assistant for terrorist finance, as was proposed last fall by the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Terrorist Financing. The U.S. should press the EU, the G-8, and all countries in the Middle East to criminalize all fundraising for Hamas, everywhere. The U.S. Treasury should use the Patriot Act Section 311 special designations to apply sanctions to designated foreign financial institutions that we know to have allowed themselves to be used for funneling terrorist funds, tailoring the sanctions to achieve the maximum impact on terrorist financing. We should be sharing greater information with the U.S. private sector regarding what we know and suspect about terrorist money laundering and finance. We should be intensifying our training efforts with other countries on specific strategies to counter terrorist finance. And when it comes to terrorist financiers, regardless of their location or their nationality, we should be prepared to name names and freeze assets, regardless of such political considerations as whether the terrorist financiers live in a large, oil producing Gulf State. As for Saudi Arabia, it needs to arrest terrorist financiers, freeze their assets, and announce these actions in public. Without substantial and visible public actions by Saudi Arabia against terrorist financiers, continued stress in the U.S.-Saudi relationship is not merely probable.

#### Funding Methods For Terrorism.

The methods employed by terrorist groups to garner illicit profits are varied, and each group routinely employs one or more mechanisms to raise funds, to place and layer funds, and to invest funds for terrorism. These include a mixture of ideological, religious,

criminal, and business sources, which often mingle and merge, so that it becomes difficult to determine the provenance of any particular terrorist funds in any given case.

Terrorist funds for Al Qaeda have come not only from misapplied Islamic charitable contributions but also from investments in otherwise legitimate businesses, such as Al Barakaat's financial services and Telecommunications Empire. Traditional sources of funds for criminal organizations are also tapped, especially extortion. There also been a number of reports that businessmen paid Al-Qaeda operatives extortion money to prevent attacks on their business interests throughout the Middle East. The alleged payments were made to assuage Bin Laden, who reportedly threatened to initiate attacks against targets in politically moderate Middle Eastern states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the tiny Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which controls sections of the southern Philippines and has close ties with a number of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, routinely demands monthly "revolutionary taxes" from local residents, businessmen, and white-collar workers. It also raises funds through kidnappings for ransom.

Terrorist groups are also linked to narcotics trafficking. The LTTE, a highly organized terrorist group centered in the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka, reportedly has close ties to drug trafficking networks in Burma, and members of Hizballah are linked to drug trafficking in Lebanon. The Al-Qaeda network received millions of dollars per annum through the production and distribution of opium, which was smuggled through neighboring Central Asian states, or transported to distribution networks in East Africa. Many terrorist groups have also been linked to other criminal activities, including smuggling and counterfeiting operations. For instance, the Real IRA is active in smuggling assorted goods into Great Britain. In recent years the Real IRA established close links to British criminal groups to sell converted diesel fuel on the black market. Moreover the Real IRA established tobacco-smuggling operational links to east European mafia, and oversees counterfeit operations that produce pirated copies of compact discs and videocassettes. When these illicit profits are coupled with the millions of dollars raised by Irish communities in the United States, the Real IRA can easily afford to recruit new members, construct bomb-making facilities, procure light weaponry, and maintain close contact with other terrorist groups, especially in the Americas.

Funds raised through criminal activities are supplemented with private donations. Prior to Al Qaeda taking advantage of charitable contributions, this approach was undertaken by both Hamas and Hizbollah, which during the 1980 and 1990s received significant financial support from Palestinian émigrés in Western Europe and the US, and even greater support from wealthy Muslims within the Middle East in their course of their making of *zakat*, or charitable contributions. Since the onset of the Second Intifada in mid-2000, Muslim clerics and religious leaders from Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, and Jordan publicly and routinely solicit Muslims to support suicide attacks against Israel by making donations to Hamas activists. The backing of religious leaders in the Middle East provides Hamas with spiritual support, and assures a sympathetic presence in mosques, which routinely collect funds for the movement. Efforts to combat terrorist finance schemes were bolstered by pledges from Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates



to improve the monitoring of charitable donations. This may prove a difficult task. Intelligence agencies anticipate that the increased presence of U.S. troops in the Middle East may foster anti-US sentiment in the region, and increase donations to charities linked to Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

The growing sophistication and participation of Islamic investors in western finance has also provided an increased source of opportunity for terrorist finance. International investigations continue among securities regulators to determine whether international commodities and futures markets, customarily a secure means of conducting financial transactions with relative anonymity, were used by buyers who knew about the 11 September attacks in advance. In the days after the attacks on the U.S., financial regulators uncovered an unusual pattern of purchases in shares of a number of companies that fell 40% after the attacks, and other suspicious investments. Though no certain links have been made to members of terrorist organizations, at least one purchaser of the suspect investments reportedly left more than \$2 million in profits uncollected after September 11, rather than claim the funds and thereby risk identification.

The extent to which nation-states continue to sponsor terrorist groups remains an open question. The Al-Qaeda network received significant passive and active support from more than one government in the region, and its support from wealthy Saudi Arabians is by now difficult to dispute based on documentation found on the hard drives of computers used by Al Qaeda operatives. U.S. officials continue to signal, with little public evidence to date, that Iraq may have provided support for some Al-Qaeda operations, including the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. There are also reports that Iran has significantly increased funding to a number of Middle Eastern terrorist groups. In an attempt to radicalize the Palestinian peace process and establish an Islamic Palestinian state similar to its own, Iran has allegedly increased its financial support for Hamas through wire transfers in Jordan. According to public reports, the Iranian embassy in Damascus has been frequently used as a meeting place for members of Hamas and Iranian intelligence agents, suggesting ongoing cooperation among Syria, Iran and Hamas.

#### Role of The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood ("Brotherhood") has played a central role in providing both the ideological and technical capacities for supporting terrorist finance on a global basis. Officially *Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, literally translated as the Society of Muslim Brothers, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a religious and political organization in Egypt in 1928 by an pan-Islamicist, Hasan al-Banna. Early opposed to secular tendencies in Islamic nations, the organization has sought to foster a return to the original precepts of the *Qur'an*. It grew rapidly, establishing an educational, economic, military, and political infrastructure. Threatened by its power, Egypt's government banned the organization in 1948 and 1954. It has since existed largely as a clandestine but militant group, marked by its rejection of Western influences.

Elements of the Brotherhood reached Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states following the Egyptian diaspora. Egyptian Salawfi Muslims involved in the Brotherhood came into closer contact with Saudi Wahabism, and the Brotherhood began to access to Saudi and other Gulf state funds through the zakat process. As a result, Islamic militants had access to revenue streams with no controls that they used to support Islamic associations, Islamic proselytizing, and in some cases, militant and terrorist activity. This Gulf State support, in which Kuwait has played a substantial secondary to Saudi Arabia's primary role, has likely been the most significant source of Al-Qaeda's funding.

As described by Kuwaiti liberal politician Abdallah Bishara, "Charitable associations of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have invested huge sums in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries to create a structure of schools, Koranic seminaries, Islamic cooperatives, humanitarian associations, and social services networks that feed Islamic terrorism. This Islamic system is the rear echelon that supports Bin Laden. And this is why it becomes truly specious to try to check with a magnifying lens whether this money has indeed ended up in Bin Laden's pockets. What really counts is knowing that the military training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya that are under Bin Laden's authority are nurtured by that Islamic system which in its turn was created with money from the Gulf. You will not find a single cent in the possession of these organizations that did not come from the Gulf region. . . . If it were wanted to dry up the funding sources of terrorist organizations at the world level it would not be difficult, because they are all concentrated here in the Gulf region."

One example of the relationship of the Brotherhood to the development of Al Qaeda funding networks, as well as to the involvement of wealthy individuals from Gulf States, is the allegation that Al Taqwa, one of the Brotherhood's major financial mechanisms during the 1990's, received funds from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates that were then transferred to its accounts in Malta and Lugano and then to the Bahamas. Another is the number of Islamic institutions based in Yemen with alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood alleged to act as incubators for terrorist training. These included the al-Baihani school in Aden, owned by a charity, now forcibly closed by Yemen's government, the private al-Iman university, run by Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a leader of the Islah party's radical wing, also temporarily closed, and the Dar Al-Hadith institute, located in a tribal region where Yemeni forces had been searching for suspected Al-Qaeda members, was closed. Last year, the government pushed through a bill unifying the education curriculum and abolishing the so-called scientific institutes - strict Islamic schools with connections to Sudan's erstwhile spiritual leader, Hassan al-Turabi, and, allegedly, Osama bin Laden.

The Brotherhood's role in the development of other militant Islamic organizations is also illustrated by its relationship to the establishment of the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya, the JI, created with the aim of setting up an Islamic state in Indonesia. JI's founder has acknowledged being inspired by the Brotherhood in the goal of jihad as a means to the creation of an Islamic state in South East Asia covering Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the southern Philippines. JI then received funding from wealthy Saudis affiliated with Al Qaeda. In turn, the Brotherhood's central financial mechanism,

Al Taqwa, established operations in Malaysia that linked to JI. According to the U.S. Treasury, the al Taqwa group, which was designated as terrorist financiers by Treasury on November 7, 2001, has long acted as financial advisers to Al Qaeda, with offices in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Caribbean, providing direct assistance to Osama bin Laden as well as investment advice and cash transfer mechanisms for Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups.

Separately, the Brotherhood has been characterized by the U.S. Treasury as the parent from which Hamas ultimately emerged. It also has been linked to a wide range of Islamic terrorist groups, including at various times over the past two decades, the Tamil Tigers, the Afghan mujahidin, the Kashmiri mujahidin, and wars of Islamic revival from Algeria to Egypt, Sudan to Saudi Arabia, Bosnia to Chechnya, Afghanistan to Kashmir, and Central Asia to Mindanao in the Philippines.

In summary, the Brotherhood spread both the ideology of militant pan-Islamicism and became the spine upon which funding operations for militant pan-Islamicism was built, taking funds largely generated from wealthy Gulf State elites and distributing them for terrorist education, recruitment, and operations widely dispersed throughout the world, especially in areas where Muslims hoped to displace non-Muslim or secular governments.

#### International Efforts to Counter Terrorist Finance.

The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism was proposed eighteen months before 11 September 2001, but had received little serious attention. Forty-one states had signed the Convention, but only six had ratified the convention before September 2001. After 11 September 2001, in an effort to assure U.N. support for combating terrorist finance schemes, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 (UNSCR 1373), a binding document that requires all 189 U.N. member states to criminalize the use or collection of funds intended, or known to be intended, for terrorism; freeze immediately funds, assets or economic resources of persons who commit, attempt to commit, or facilitate terrorist acts and entities owned or controlled by them; prohibit nationals or persons within their territories from aiding or providing any aid to the persons and entities involved in terrorism; refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorism; and deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens.

Member states were required to submit progress reports, providing information as to how they have implemented Resolution 1373 by the end of 2001. The incomplete, and in some cases misleading responses provided a window of the distance yet required to combat terrorist finance by governments in some of the most vulnerable countries. For instance, UAE described as anti-terrorist legislation laws forbidding efforts to engage in armed overthrow of the governments of the UAE. Responses by Yemen and Oman were too vague to permit analysis of whether they had undertaken any substantial anti-terrorist efforts. During 2002, however, a number of countries, including most of those in the